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This is a fascinating and important book about how to interpret the wave function of 
quantum theory.  It is clearly written, up to date, and has a wealth of interesting things to say. 
In what follows I give a summary of just some of the topics of the book. 
It begins with a brief exposition of the formalism of orthodox quantum theory and von 
Neumann's account of measurement.  Shan Gao goes on to discuss the question of whether 
the wave function can be interpreted ontologically, as specifying the actual physical state of 
the quantum system, or whether it should be interpreted epistemologically, as encapsulating 
our incomplete knowledge of the system.  After weighing up arguments for and against these 
two views, Gao rejects the epistemological view, and adopts the ontological view.  He then 
goes on to give an exposition and careful discussion of the modern version of Bohm's 
interpretation of quantum theory which, after discussion, is rejected.  There is also a critical 
discussion of the Everett or many worlds interpretation of quantum theory. 
Gao then gives a sympathetic discussion of Schrödinger's charge density interpretation of 
the wave function, an interpretation which is, however, rejected because of the problem posed 
by systems of two or more quantum entangled particles.  This leads on to a discussion of the 
view that a configuration space of 3N dimensions, associated with a system of N quantum 
entangled particles should be regarded as real.  This view, defended by David Albert,1 is 
rejected.  Gao sensibly adopts the view that a system of N quantum entangled particles should 
be regarded as having correlated states in three dimensional physical space. 
Gao then proceeds to expound the realist interpretation of quantum theory he wishes to 
defend.  A quantum system, such as an electron, is held to exhibit very rapid discontinuous 
motion, very briefly occupying values of spatial position, momentum and energy in such a 
way as to accord with what orthodox quantum theory predicts, given relevant measurements.  
The wave function specifies the state of that which determines, probabilistically, the 
discontinuous motion of the electron. 
Ascribing precise values of position, momentum, energy, and other such physical 
quantities, to particles at any given instant would seem to contradict a famous theorem due to 
Kochen and Specker.  Gao argues that there are two ways in which this contradiction can be 
overcome, and he justifies his choice. 
Gao goes on to expound in some detail his solution to the quantum measurement problem.  
A system whose quantum state is in a superposition of energy eigenstates, over time evolves 
into one or other eigenstate.  Imprecise energy becomes precise.  The system does this, 
however, in such a way that, statistically, energy is conserved as far as the ensemble of 
systems in the same pure state is concerned.  Gao argues that the specific  postulate he puts 
forward is such that almost all ordinary experiments performed on quantum systems that are 
in superpositions of energy eigenstates would not detect deviations from Schrödinger's 
equation and the predictions of orthodox quantum theory.  At the same time, he argues, his 
collapse postulate predicts that macroscopic measuring instruments, employed in quantum 
measurements evolve, not into superpositions of macroscopic states (as the Schrödinger 
equation would imply) but into just one of the macroscopic states that are possible.  The 
proposed collapse postulate provides a potential  solution to the measurement problem, in 
other words! 
In a little more detail, Gao's collapse postulate amounts to the following.  The quantum 
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 ψ(to) = ∑ Ci(to) |Ei > 
            i = 1 
 
Gao's idea is that, as time passes, the system - undergoing rapid discontinuous motion from 
one energy eigenstate to another - will tend to spend more time in some eigenstates than 
others, the outcome being that those eigenstates that are occupied for slightly longer times 
will progressively increase in probability, until eventually the probability of the system being 
in one specific eigenstate is 1, and the probability of it being in any of the other eigenstates is 
correspondingly 0. 
An important feature of Gao's proposal is that time is held to be discontinuous, the shortest 
nugget of time being the Planck time, tp, the time it takes for light to travel the Planck 







Here, ħ = h/2π, where h is Planck's constant, G is the gravitational constant, and c is velocity 
of light in a vacuum.   
Employing the idea that the longer the system remains in the state |Ei >, so the more 
probable it will be for the system to be in that state, Gao arrives at the following formula for 
the collapse time tc:- 
 
tc   ≈  ħ Ep   . 
         (∆E)2 
 
Here Ep = h/tp, the Planck energy, and ∆E is the energy uncertainty of the initial state. 
As Gao points out, others before him have proposed that probabilistic collapse is to be 
associated with decrease in energy uncertainty with the passage of time.  Specifically, Ian 
Percival2 and Lane Hughston3 have put forward versions of this idea.  These have been 
criticized by Philip Pearle4 on the grounds that they do not procure spatially localized states 
of macroscopic objects in the way that is required to solve the measurement problem.  Gao 
argues that his own collapse postulate escapes Pearle's critical strictures because of a crucial 
difference between his proposal, and the proposals of Percival and Hughston.  According to 
Gao's postulate, the energy uncertainty of a many-body system in a partially quantum 
entangled state "is not the uncertainty of the total energy of all subsystems, but the sum of the 
absolute energy uncertainty of every subsystem" (p. 121).  It is this feature of the collapse 
postulate, Gao argues, which enables it to evade Pearle's criticisms of earlier, similar 
proposals (see pp. 130-132). 
Gao calculates that standard quantum mechanical experiments would not detect the 
different predictions of orthodox quantum theory and his version of the theory.  This is 
because energy uncertainties of quantum micro systems are too small to make the different 
predictions detectable.  The energy uncertainty of a photon emitted from an atom is of the 
order of 10-6 eV, which means that the collapse time, according to Gao's formula, is 1025 
seconds, which is much longer than the age of the universe, some 1017 seconds.  But when it 
comes to macroscopic bodies and phenomena, energy uncertainty can be very much larger, 
and collapse times correspondingly very much shorter, of the order of 10-4 seconds Gao 
suggests in connection with one example (p. 133). 
Gao holds, nevertheless, that his postulate is, at least in principle, testable.  The nucleus of 
the naturally occurring element Tantalum (180Ta) is such that the energy gap between the 
ground state and the first excited state is 75 keV.  This means, according to Gao's postulate, 
that a superposition of these two states decays into one or other state with a collapse time of 
some 20 minutes (p. 129). 
Gao goes on to discuss rival collapse theories of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber, Roger 
Penrose, and others, and concludes with a discussion of the problems of extending the 
postulate into the relativistic domain. 
I may not be the best person to give an impartial assessment of Gao's book.  Decades ago I 
published a paper calling for physicists to stop trying to solve the measurement problem (as 
then conceived); instead they should remove all references to observables and measurement 
from the theory, and concentrate on putting forward testable conjectures about the physical 
conditions necessary and sufficient for probabilistic transitions to occur, formulated in 
elementary, precise, quantum mechanical terms.5  And in an attempt to provoke such work, I 
went on, subsequently, to suggest that quantum theory may have its own entirely new 
ontology of fundamentally probabilistic entities (propensitons); these might interact 
probabilistically whenever new "particles" or bound systems are created or destroyed as a 
result of inelastic interactions.  I am therefore predisposed to welcome enthusiastically Gao's 
book.  Even though Gao writes about solving the measurement problem, he nevertheless does 
just what I think physicists ought to do: put forward precise, testable conjectures concerning 
probabilistic transitions, formulated in exclusively quantum mechanical terms.  (Others, too, 
of course, have pursued research along these lines.  Whereas once upon a time questioning 
orthodox quantum theory was taboo in physics, nowadays there is a much wider recognition 
that orthodoxy is untenable, and a better version of the theory needs to be established.) 
Does Gao's collapse postulate succeed in evading Pearle's criticism of similar proposals?  
Does it escape obvious empirical refutation, and at the same time successfully account for the 
absence of superpositions of macro states of affairs (when these appear not to exist)?  Does it 
successfully account for localization when loss of energy uncertainty almost seems to imply 
the opposite (an issue Gao discusses explicitly)?  Is it acceptable that the universe gradually 
loses energy uncertainty as time passes?  If the answer to all these questions is "yes", the 
crucial question becomes: Is the basic collapse postulate testable in practice?  I do not feel 
competent to pronounce authoritatively on these matters, but I can say that, in my view, The 
Meaning of the Wave Function makes a courageous and fascinating contribution to 
understanding the quantum domain.  I hope it provokes research from others along similar 
lines. 
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